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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

INTERMEDIATE SCRUTINY AS A SOLUTION TO ECONOMIC
PROTECTIONISM IN OCCUPATIONAL LICENSING
INTRODUCTION
There has been an explosion in the growth of occupational licensing laws
in the last few decades.1 In the early 1950s, less than five percent of the United
States workforce had an occupation requiring a state license.2 By the late
1980s, that number had grown to eighteen percent.3 In 2006, twenty-nine
percent of the workforce needed a government license to work.4 Though
occupational licensing affects a larger portion of the workforce than labor
unions or the minimum wage, it does not receive nearly as much attention.5
Occupational licensing laws are usually enacted in the name of consumer
protection.6 However, they often impose barriers to entry, stifling competition
and favoring those who are already established in the industry.7 Occupational
licensing laws increase the cost of doing business, making it more difficult for
people to enter the market.8 There is broad agreement that these laws reduce
consumer welfare by making products and services more expensive, and giving
consumers fewer choices.9

1. Joseph Sanderson, Note, Don’t Bury the Competition: The Growth of Occupational
Licensing and a Toolbox for Reform, 31 YALE J. ON REG. 455, 458 (2014).
2. Morris M. Kleiner & Alan B. Krueger, Analyzing the Extent and Influence of
Occupational Licensing on the Labor Market, 31 J. LAB. ECON. S173, S175 (2013).
3. Id.
4. Sanderson, supra note 1, at 458.
5. Kleiner & Krueger, supra note 2, at S176. In 2008, about twelve percent of workers were
union members. Id. That year, there were 129,377,000 wage and salary workers, and 2,226,000
workers with wages at or below the minimum wage. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T
OF LABOR, CHARACTERISTICS OF MINIMUM WAGE WORKERS: 2008 (Mar. 11, 2009),
http://www.bls.gov/opub/reports/cps/minimumwageworkers_2008.pdf [http://perma.cc/2XLL-D6
PW]. Therefore, approximately 1.7% of workers had wages at or below the minimum wage. See
id.
6. Sanderson, supra note 1, at 456.
7. See Susan Rose-Ackerman, Inalienability and the Theory of Property Rights, 85 COLUM.
L. REV. 931, 953 (1985).
8. See Lana Harfoush, Grave Consequences for Economic Liberty: The Funeral Industry’s
Protectionist Occupational Licensing Scheme, the Circuit Split, and Why It Matters, 5 J. BUS.
ENTREPRENEURSHIP & L. 135, 159 (2011).
9. Sanderson, supra note 1, at 455.
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For example, hair braiding is a low- to moderate-income occupation that
requires a cosmetology license in most states.10 Though braiders do not cut
hair, or use chemicals, dyes, or coloring agents, braiders in many states must
pay thousands of dollars and endure hundreds of hours of coursework in order
to avoid criminal prosecution.11 The required training is unnecessary because it
almost never teaches hair braiding.12 Instead, braiders must learn practices they
never intend to use, such as giving manicures and bleaching hair.13 For
example, Missouri forces hair braiders to spend $16,000 and 1500 hours to get
a cosmetology license.14 One hundred and ten hours are dedicated to
manicuring, arm massages, and hand massages, and 260 hours are dedicated to
cutting, coloring, and bleaching hair, all of which are services hair braiders do
not offer.15 Zero hours are devoted to teaching African hair braiding, and only
four percent of the coursework covers sterilization, sanitation, and scalp
diseases.16 In Missouri and other states, it is easier to become a licensed
emergency medical technician (EMT) than a licensed cosmetologist.17
Cosmetology license laws harm those with limited resources for two
reasons. First, those with limited resources are more likely to become hair
braiders because little financial capital is required to start a braiding business.18
Second, the necessary skills, rather than requiring extensive formal education,
are passed from generation to generation.19 Cosmetology licenses also have a
disproportionate effect on African Americans and African immigrants because
they are more likely to become hair braiders.20
Another service subject to onerous licensure burdens is teeth whitening.
Since Crest Whitestrips were introduced in 2001, skyrocketing demand for
products like gum and toothpaste, and for services offered by dentists, salons,
spas, and mall kiosks, has turned teeth whitening into an eleven billion dollar

10. PAUL AVELAR & NICK SIBILLA, UNTANGLING REGULATIONS: NATURAL HAIR
BRAIDERS FIGHT AGAINST IRRATIONAL LICENSING 8 (July 2014).
11. Id. at 3.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 13, Niang v. Carroll, 4:14-cv-01100
(E.D. Mo. June 16, 2014), ECF No. 1.
15. MO. REV. STAT. § 329.040(4) (2000).
16. Id.
17. Greg Reed, Untangle African-Style Braiders from Missouri’s Irrational Cosmetology
Laws, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, June 24, 2014, at A17.
18. Valerie Bayham, A Dream Deferred: Legal Barriers to African Hairbraiding
Nationwide, INST. FOR JUST., http://www.ij.org/report/a-dream-deferred/ [http://perma.cc/5PWYCKUX] (last visited Sept. 21, 2015).
19. Id.
20. See id.
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industry.21 As the industry grew, state dental boards and dental associations
lobbied for laws enabling dentists and hygienists to capture a larger share of
the market by banning anyone else from offering teeth whitening services.22
Though dental boards and associations argue that expanded licensing promotes
public health and safety, the risks of teeth whitening are minimal.23
Entrepreneurs in spas, salons, and kiosks provide the same over-the-counter
products that anyone, even a minor, can buy at a store and apply at home
without supervision, instruction, or a prescription.24 These businesses simply
provide places for customers to apply these products to their own teeth.25 A
study examining complaints filed with state agencies found that of the ninetyseven complaints provided, only four reported consumer harm.26 The rest came
not from consumers, but from state boards, dental associations, dentists, and
hygienists alleging the unlicensed practice of dentistry.27 The four consumer
complaints only reported “reversible side-effects typical of teeth whitening
wherever it is done, such as temporary gum irritation and tooth sensitivity.”28
With such minimal risks, the more likely purpose of these laws is to protect
dentists from honest competition. Eighty percent of dentists offer teeth
whitening, and typically charge two to six times more for teeth whitening than
salons and kiosks.29 Laws putting lower-cost competitors out of business
enable dentists to capture a greater share of the market and maintain high
prices.
These examples may seem extreme, but they are surprisingly common.
Thirty-nine states and the District of Columbia require individuals to obtain a
cosmetology license to braid hair.30 At least thirty states have attempted to shut
down teeth whitening businesses.31 Fourteen have changed their laws to
exclude all but licensed dentists, hygienists, or dental assistants from offering

21. ANGELA C. ERICKSON, WHITE OUT: HOW DENTAL INDUSTRY INSIDERS THWART
COMPETITION FROM TEETH-WHITENING ENTREPRENEURS 2 (Apr. 2013).
22. Id. at 1.
23. Id. at 24.
24. See id. at 1.
25. Id. at 4.
26. ERICKSON, supra note 21, at 4.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 25.
29. Id. at 1–2. Dentists charge between $600 and $1200 per procedure. See id. at 25. In
2006, dentists performed an average of seventy procedures a year for average annual revenues of
$350 to $25,000 per procedure. Id. at 2. Teeth whitening services at salons and spas are as low as
$109, $139, or $150. Id. at 2, 25.
30. AVELAR & SIBILLA, supra note 10, at 3.
31. Angela C. Erickson & Paul Sherman, Teeth-Whitening Rules Take a Bite Out of
Business, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 29, 2013), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB100014241278873244825
04578451262629236322 [http://perma.cc/FU24-8SKJ].
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teeth whitening services.32 At least twenty-five state dental boards have
ordered teeth whitening businesses to shut down.33
In the post-Lochner era, federal courts give state and local governments a
high level of freedom to regulate economic conduct through means such as
occupational licensing laws. However, as the number of occupations requiring
a license has significantly increased recently, many of these governments have
faced lawsuits in federal court, alleging violations of due process and equal
protection. The federal courts that have ruled on these issues are split. Each of
them has used a slightly different analysis with varying levels of scrutiny, each
coming to different results.
In Part I, this Comment will examine the increasing prevalence of
licensing laws and the effect these laws have on society. Part II will evaluate
the possible standards of review that can be applied to challenges of licensing
laws. In Part III, this Comment will outline how the Fifth, Sixth, and Tenth
Circuits have approached three cases with nearly identical facts in different
ways. Finally, Part IV will explain why an intermediate scrutiny standard of
review should be categorically applied to occupational licensing laws.
I. OCCUPATIONAL LICENSING PROBLEMS
There are a number of problems created by occupational licensing laws.
First of all, the burdens imposed by occupational licensing laws are
particularly onerous for economically disadvantaged groups34 and racial
minorities.35 Licensing laws restrict social mobility by increasing operating
costs for those who can least afford to pay them.36 Licensing laws often target
low- and moderate-income vocations that require little formal training, such as
hair styling, pest control, and exercise instruction.37 If no license is required,
these vocations provide a relatively quick path for individuals to work their
way out of poverty.38 Licensing regulations harm low-income workers who
have the skills to compete but lack the formal training or financial resources to

32. ERICKSON, supra note 21, at 2.
33. Id.
34. Sanderson, supra note 1, at 460.
35. Stuart Dorsey, Occupational Licensing and Minorities, 7 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 171, 172
(1983); David E. Bernstein, Licensing Laws: A Historical Example of the Use of Government
Regulatory Power Against African-Americans, 31 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 89, 90 (1994).
36. James C. Cooper & William E. Kovacic, U.S. Convergence With International
Competition Norms: Antitrust Law and Public Restraints on Competition, 90 B.U. L. REV. 1555,
1566–67 (2010).
37. Id. at 1567; DICK M. CARPENTER II ET AL., LICENSE TO WORK: A NATIONAL STUDY OF
BURDENS FROM OCCUPATIONAL LICENSING 10 tbl.1 (May 2012).
38. Cooper & Kovacic, supra note 36, at 1567.
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meet onerous licensure requirements.39 These requirements pose additional
hurdles for ethnic minorities and immigrants because licensing exams are
usually only offered in English.40 Licensing laws also give a great deal of
discretion to independent boards that have historically abused their powers by
keeping minorities, immigrants, and women out of the industries they
regulate.41 By targeting low-income vocations, licensing laws eliminate
potential ways to make a living for those who already have few options.42
Licensing laws also disproportionately harm low-income consumers. The
higher prices that licensing laws create are an inconvenience to many, but to
the poor they can mean the difference between being able to access a service or
not.43 Licensing laws may sometimes be good for those who value quality.44
However, licensing laws harm those who prefer the option to choose a lower
quality for a lower price, especially when the alternative is not having access to
a service at all.45
Licensing lower-income occupations does not promote public safety.
Occupational licensing laws often target occupations that have little risk of
harm, such as interior designer, shampooer, florist, funeral attendant, barber,
travel guide, and tour guide.46 The burden of obtaining a license is often not
proportional to the potential risks of the occupation. A study comparing the
licensure requirements for 102 low- and moderate-income occupations found
that sixty-six occupations had greater average licensure burdens than EMTs,
including landscape workers and manicurists.47 While the average EMT
license requires a month of training, the average cosmetology license requires
a year of training.48 Interior designers face the greatest licensure burdens—
greater than those faced by midwives, school bus drivers, crane operators,
pharmacy technicians, EMTs, and security guards.49 Though many
occupational licensing laws have little to do with protecting the public, they do
protect those who already have a license from honest competition.

39. Roger V. Abbott, Is Economic Protectionism a Legitimate Governmental Interest Under
Rational Basis Review?, 62 CATH. U. L. REV. 475, 501 (2013).
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Cooper & Kovacic, supra note 36, at 1567.
43. Id. at 1566.
44. See Ginevra Bruzzone, Deregulation of Structurally Competitive Services: Economic
Analysis and Competition Advocacy, in THE ANTICOMPETITIVE IMPACT OF REGULATION 5, 10
(Giuliano Amato & Laraine L. Laudati eds., 2001).
45. See id.
46. CARPENTER ET AL., supra note 37, at 10–11, 31.
47. Id. at 26, 29.
48. Id. at 29.
49. Id. at 12–13.
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Though the principal justification for occupational licensing is quality
control, empirical studies generally find that tougher licensing laws have little
to no effect on increased quality, and that they may even negatively impact
quality.50 By collecting and summarizing various studies, University of
Minnesota Professor Morris Kleiner found very little evidence of enhanced
quality in licensed occupations.51 One study found that restrictive dental
licensing laws were not correlated with improved dental health, maybe because
the laws made it more expensive to visit a dentist or because the tougher
licensing standards were irrelevant to standards of dental care.52 Another study
found a significant negative correlation between requiring teachers to be
licensed and teacher quality.53 Perhaps the time and money required to obtain
the requisite qualifications made teaching less attractive to individuals who
would have made good teachers.54 Another study found no difference in fraud
among TV repairers in New Orleans and Washington, D.C., though New
Orleans required a license to repair TVs.55 A study examining occupational
licensing of opticians found that licensing laws increased consumer costs and
optician salaries but created no observable change in quality.56 While
occupational licensing often fails to ensure safety and quality, it almost always
harms consumers and entrepreneurs for the sake of entrenching special
interests.57
II. STANDARDS OF REVIEW
With some variation, there are three basic standards of review that federal
courts can apply when examining constitutional challenges to state laws: strict
scrutiny, intermediate scrutiny, and rational basis review.58 To survive strict
scrutiny, a law must be narrowly tailored to address a compelling
governmental interest and be the least restrictive means of achieving that
interest.59 Strict scrutiny is only used if the law infringes a fundamental

50. Id. at 6, 29–30; MORRIS M. KLEINER, LICENSING OCCUPATIONS: ENSURING QUALITY
52–56 (2006).
51. KLEINER, supra note 50, at 52–56.
52. CARPENTER ET AL., supra note 37, at 9, 50–51.
53. Dale Ballou & Michael Podgursky, Teacher Recruitment and Retention in Public and
Private Schools, 17 J. POL’Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 393, 412, 414–15 (1998).
54. See id.
55. KLEINER, supra note 50, at 55.
56. Edward J. Timmons & Anna Mills, Bringing the Effects of Occupational Licensing Into
Focus: Optician Licensing in the United States 18 (Feb. 2015) (unpublished manuscript) (on file
with the George Mason University Mercatus Center).
57. See Rose-Ackerman, supra note 7, at 953.
58. Abbott, supra note 39, at 481–82.
59. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995); Bernal v. Fainter, 467
U.S. 216, 219 (1984).
OR RESTRICTING COMPETITION?
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constitutional right or targets a suspect classification, such as race.60 Under
current Supreme Court law, strict scrutiny is not applied to alleged violations
of economic freedom.61 Rational basis review is on the other end of the
spectrum. To be found constitutional under rational basis review, a statute only
needs to be reasonably related to a legitimate state interest.62 Laws that
implicate unenumerated rights and rights that the Supreme Court has not
declared fundamental receive rational basis review.63 Rational basis review
almost always results in the challenged law being upheld.64 Intermediate
scrutiny falls somewhere between strict scrutiny and rational basis review.
Intermediate scrutiny requires a law to be substantially related to an important
government interest.65 Intermediate scrutiny applies when a law targets a
quasi-suspect classification, such as gender.66 Under current Supreme Court
precedent, laws that allegedly violate one’s economic freedom are subject to
rational basis review.67
III. CASKET LICENSING LAWS: A CIRCUIT SPLIT
In 2002, the Sixth Circuit in Craigmiles v. Giles struck down a Tennessee
law that made it illegal to sell a casket without a funeral director license.68 One
of the plaintiffs, Craigmiles, was a pastor who was threatened with criminal
prosecution for selling caskets for a fraction of what funeral establishments
charged.69 Though he did not handle dead bodies, Craigmiles would have had
to embalm twenty-five dead bodies and get years of training costing thousands
of dollars in order to get a funeral director license.70 The state argued that the
requirements were necessary to safeguard public health and protect vulnerable

60. Adarand, 515 U.S. at 227; San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 16
(1973).
61. City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303 (1976).
62. Id.
63. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720–21 (1997).
64. Jeffrey D. Jackson, Be Careful What You Wish For: Why McDonald v. City of Chicago’s
Rejection of the Privileges or Immunities Clause May Not Be Such a Bad Thing for Rights, 115
PENN ST. L. REV. 561, 593 (2011).
65. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976).
66. Id.; City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 440–41 (1985).
67. Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 456, 460.
68. Craigmiles v. Giles, 312 F.3d 220, 222, 229 (6th Cir. 2002).
69. The Right to Urn an Honest Living: Challenging Tennessee’s Casket Monopoly, INST.
FOR JUST., http://www.ij.org/tennessee-caskets-background [http://perma.cc/F7R5-ECV6] (last
visited Sept. 27, 2015).
70. IJ Breaks up Tennessee Casket Cartel; Scores First Federal Appellate Victory for
Economic Liberty Since New Deal, INST. FOR JUST., http://www.clinic.ij.org/craigmiles-v-giles
[http://perma.cc/GPG5-2U98] (last visited Sept. 27, 2015).
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consumers.71 The court found that the law existed only to protect established
funeral directors, an illegitimate government interest.72
In 2004, the Tenth Circuit decided Powers v. Harris, a case with facts
almost identical to those in Craigmiles.73 The court did not consider whether
Oklahoma’s casket selling law was rationally related to consumer protection
(the state’s proffered reason for the law).74 Instead, the court considered
whether economic protectionism was a legitimate state interest, asserting that
the Supreme Court allows courts to seek out any conceivable reason for
validating a state law.75 Purporting to apply rational basis review, the Powers
court found that, absent a violation of an express constitutional prohibition or
the Dormant Commerce Clause, intrastate economic protectionism is a
legitimate state interest.76 To support this, the court cited Supreme Court cases
that, in its view, suggested that states could favor one intrastate industry for
another.77 The court relied on a quote from Williamson v. Lee Optical of
Oklahoma, which stated that “free[ing a] profession, to as great an extent as
possible, from all taints of commercialism” is a legitimate state goal.78 Because
Oklahoma’s law was rationally related to protecting established funeral
directors, the court held that it survived rational basis review and was
constitutional.79 The Powers court criticized the Sixth Circuit for applying a
more stringent form of rational basis review by focusing on the legislature’s
motives and the legislative history behind the law challenged in Craigmiles.80
In 2013, the Fifth Circuit decided St. Joseph Abbey v. Castille, a case with
facts almost identical to those in Powers and Craigmiles.81 Benedictine monks
tried to sell handmade caskets to raise money for their monastery, but the
monks were threatened with criminal prosecution.82 The court found that mere
economic protectionism is not a legitimate state interest under rational basis
review and, because the licensing law furthered no other interest, it was

71. Craigmiles, 312 F.3d at 225.
72. Id. at 227, 229.
73. Timothy Sandefur, Is Economic Exclusion a Legitimate State Interest? Four Recent
Cases Test the Boundaries, 14 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1023, 1024–25 (2006).
74. See Powers v. Harris, 379 F.3d 1208, 1218 (10th Cir. 2004).
75. Id. at 1218–19.
76. Id. at 1222–23.
77. Id. at 1221.
78. Id. (citing Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., 348 U.S. 483, 491 (1955)).
79. Powers, 379 F.3d at 1222–24.
80. Id. at 1223.
81. Abbott, supra note 39, at 491.
82. St. Joseph Abbey v. Castille, 835 F. Supp. 2d 149, 153–54 (E.D. La. 2011), aff’d, 712
F.3d 215 (5th Cir. 2013). Under Louisiana law, those who sell caskets without a funeral director
license face fines of up to $2500 and 180 days imprisonment per casket. Id.
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unconstitutional.83 The court began its analysis by rejecting the argument that
mere economic protection of an industry is a legitimate government purpose.84
It criticized the Powers court’s characterization of the Supreme Court cases it
used.85 Those cases did not condone pure economic protectionism; they
indicated that protectionism is a legitimate interest if it is related to furthering
the general welfare or a legitimate public interest.86 The court rejected the
argument that the licensing law was rationally related to restricting predatory
sales practices and preventing the sale of faulty caskets.87 The court recognized
that rational basis review is highly deferential, but it stated that this deference
neither requires judicial blindness to the history of a challenged law or the
context surrounding its adoption nor does it require courts to accept
“nonsensical explanations” for a law.88 Because the state’s explanations were
nonsensical, and the court could not conceive of any other rational basis for the
law, the court held that the law was unconstitutional.89
IV. INTERMEDIATE SCRUTINY AS A SOLUTION TO OCCUPATIONAL LICENSING
PROBLEMS
A.

Why the Supreme Court Should Address Occupational Licensing

Though St. Joseph Abbey provided a perfect opportunity for the Supreme
Court to address the circuit split over this issue, it declined to hear the appeal.90
However, it will likely have another opportunity to address the issues raised by
these three cases because the organization that brought these lawsuits, the
Institute for Justice, shows no signs of stopping. It currently has twenty-three
“economic liberty” cases pending, most of which challenge occupational
licensing laws that require individuals to spend excessive amounts of time and
money to obtain licenses that are irrelevant to the services they provide.91
These include laws requiring a dental license to whiten teeth, laws requiring a
cosmetology license to teach makeup artistry, laws requiring animal massage
therapists to get a veterinarian license, laws banning orthodontists from

83. St. Joseph Abbey v. Castille, 712 F.3d 215, 226–27 (5th Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S.
Ct. 423 (2013).
84. Id. at 222.
85. Id. at 221–23.
86. Id. at 222.
87. Id. at 223.
88. St. Joseph Abbey, 712 F.3d at 226.
89. Id. at 226–27.
90. Castille v. St. Joseph Abbey, 134 S. Ct. 423 (2013).
91. Economic Liberty: Cases in the News, INST. FOR JUST., http://www.ij.org/cases/econom
icliberty [http://perma.cc/8WNE-7S5Q] (last visited Oct. 14, 2015).
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providing affordable teeth cleaning services, laws licensing tour guides, and
laws requiring eyebrow threaders to get a cosmetology license.92
The Institute for Justice may soon give the Supreme Court another chance
to consider occupational licensing. In June of 2014, the Institute for Justice
filed three federal lawsuits challenging the application of cosmetology licenses
to hair braiders.93 These lawsuits alleged the same constitutional violations as
suffered in St. Joseph Abbey, Craigmiles, and Powers: violations of equal
protection and substantive due process.94 In response, the Arkansas legislature
passed a law allowing hair braiders to work without obtaining a cosmetology
license.95 Similarly, the Washington Department of Licensing responded by
pursuing a new administrative rule exempting hair braiders.96 The third case,
Niang v. Carroll, is still pending in the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Missouri.97 There is a good chance that this case, or one of
the Institute’s other twenty-two cases, will deepen the circuit split and be
appealed to the Supreme Court.
The success of ridesharing services like Uber has increased public
awareness of how occupational licensing harms consumers.98 Licensure
burdens on taxi drivers and caps on the number of licenses awarded limit the
number of taxis on the road so that the demand for taxis exceeds the supply.99
This reduced supply “reduces the incentives for taxi owners to innovate and
care about consumers.”100 Operating outside of such licensing regimes, Uber
has thrived while providing wages on par with or exceeding those of licensed
taxi drivers.101 The convenience and popularity of Uber have confirmed
suspicions that licensed taxis are inefficient and have called all occupational
licensing regimes into question.102 Because so many occupational licensing

92. See id.
93. Reed, supra note 17, at A17.
94. See id.
95. “Natural Hair Braiding Protection Act” Now Law in Arkansas, INST. FOR JUST. (Mar.
19, 2015), http://www.ij.org/arkansas-hair-braiding-release-3-19-2015 [http://perma.cc/2Y6B-5W
5U].
96. Scott Shackford, Another Win Against Hair-Braiding Licensing in Washington State,
REASON (Nov. 17, 2014), http://reason.com/blog/2014/11/17/another-win-against-hair-braiding-li
cens [http://perma.cc/Y5LC-AY3D].
97. Complaint at 1, Niang v. Carroll, No. 4:14-cv-01100 (E.D. Mo. June 16, 2014), ECF No.
1.
98. Eduardo Porter, Job Licenses in Spotlight as Uber Rises, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 28, 2015, at
B1.
99. Peter Van Doren, Uber Provides Case Against Occupational Licensing, CATO INST.
(Jan. 28, 2015), http://www.cato.org/blog/uber-provides-case-against-occupational-licensing
[http://perma.cc/L263-KT6U].
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. See Porter, supra note 98, at B1.
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laws have the same anti-competitive effects as those for taxi drivers, the
success of Uber has created an opportunity for consumers to question the
efficacy of occupational licensing.103 Services like Handybook and TaskRabbit
use a platform similar to Uber’s to provide household repairs and
maintenance.104 These services also call licensing regimes into question
because many of the low- to moderate-income occupations that require a
license in the United States are construction trades, such as house painting,
landscaping, carpentry, and door repair.105
On February 25, 2015, the Supreme Court decided North Carolina Board
of Dental Examiners v. Federal Trade Commission, a case challenging the
application of a dental licensing law to teeth whiteners.106 St. Joseph Abbey,
Powers, and Craigmiles were civil rights suits alleging violations of the Due
Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. North
Carolina Board of Dental Examiners, however, is a Federal Trade
Commission (FTC) action against the North Carolina Board of Dental
Examiners for violating federal antitrust law by sending cease and desist letters
to teeth whiteners.107 The North Carolina Board of Dental Examiners argued
that, because it was a board created by the state legislature, it was a state actor
and thus immune from antitrust laws.108 The FTC argued that the board is a
private actor for the purposes of federal antitrust law because the board
members are market participants who are elected by other market
participants.109 In a six-to-three majority, the Court held that, because the
Board was made up of market participants with no active supervision by the
state, it was a private actor not immune from antitrust laws.110 Though this
decision may not directly affect civil rights suits challenging occupational
licensing on due process and equal protection grounds, it signals a willingness
to challenge occupational licensing. In explaining why the need for supervision
is so important, the court noted the dangers of regulatory capture, stating,
“When a State empowers a group of active market participants to decide who

103. Id.
104. Steven Bertoni, Handybook Wants to Be the Uber for Your Household Chores, FORBES
(Mar. 26, 2014), http://www.forbes.com/sites/stevenbertoni/2014/03/26/handybook-wants-to-bethe-uber-for-your-household-chores/ [http://perma.cc/TS75-QRTD]; Casey Newton, TaskRabbit
Is Blowing up Its Business Model and Becoming the Uber for Everything, THE VERGE (June 17,
2014), http://www.theverge.com/2014/6/17/5816254/taskrabbit-blows-up-its-auction-house-to-of
fer-services-on-demand [http://perma.cc/JJ3V-NPMJ].
105. CARPENTER ET AL., supra note 37, at 8, 10–11.
106. Adam Liptak, Regulatory Case in North Carolina Appears to Trouble Supreme Court,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 15, 2014, at A24.
107. N.C. State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs v. FTC, 135 S. Ct. 1101, 1108–09 (2015).
108. Id. at 1110.
109. See id. at 1109.
110. Id. at 1114.
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can participate in its market, and on what terms, the need for supervision is
manifest.”111 Describing the dangers of regulatory capture as obvious suggests
that the Supreme Court is sensitive to the problems of economic protectionism
in occupational licensing, just as the St. Joseph Abbey and Craigmiles courts
were.
B.

How the Supreme Court Should Address Occupational Licensing

In order to prevent the negative consequences of overly burdensome
licensing laws without damaging states’ abilities to regulate economic harms,
federal courts should categorically use intermediate scrutiny to examine the
constitutionality of occupational licensing laws. Applying intermediate
scrutiny when analyzing the constitutionality of a licensing law would prevent
the proliferation of different variations of rational basis review. Courts hearing
these occupational licensing cases purport to be applying rational basis review
but come to different results using different analyses. Though the Craigmiles
court claimed to apply rational basis review, its analysis was slightly more
rigorous than that in Powers. It required a tighter fit between the law’s means
and ends, scrutinized the legislature’s intent, and gave a narrower definition of
what is a legitimate government purpose.112 Similarly, the St. Joseph Abbey
court considered the history and actual motives behind legislation when
determining if a proffered interest was legitimate or just a pretext. This type of
heightened scrutiny is often referred to as “second-order” rational basis
review.113 As courts continue to hear cases of obvious economic protectionism,
they, like the St. Joseph Abbey and Craigmiles courts, will be compelled to
invalidate unfair laws. In order to do so, they will likely utilize second-order
rational basis review while calling it traditional rational basis review, just as
the St. Joseph Abbey and Craigmiles courts did. While second-order rational
basis review is poorly defined, there is plenty of case law interpreting
intermediate scrutiny.
Under intermediate scrutiny, a law will be invalidated if it is not
substantially related to an important government interest.114 Under this level of
scrutiny, courts will not be able to uphold protectionist laws that are only
supported by weak or minor interests. Requiring an important government
interest would invalidate pretexts like those the states gave in Craigmiles,
Powers, and St. Joseph Abbey. Preventing the spread of disease from faulty
coffins may be a legitimate government interest. However, it is not an
important government interest because there is no evidence that faulty caskets
111. Id.
112. Austin Raynor, Note, Economic Liberty and the Second-Order Rational Basis Test, 99
VA. L. REV. 1065, 1074 (2013).
113. Id.
114. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976).
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actually pose such a problem.115 Further, bans on unlicensed casket sales are
not substantially related to this interest because they are not as effective as
other less burdensome methods, such as requiring diseased bodies to be
embalmed or buried in body bags.116 Likewise, preventing casket sellers from
taking advantage of grieving customers is not an important government interest
because, as the St. Joseph Abbey court noted, the FTC found that there was no
evidence of significant consumer injury caused by sellers of funeral goods.117
Even if the Powers court found that preventing deceptive tactics was an
important government interest, it would still have to strike the licensing law
because it is not substantially related to that interest. Casket sellers are subject
to the same consumer protection laws as any other business, and the legislature
could develop standards for casket retailers without requiring an irrelevant
license.118 Therefore, even if the state offers an important interest, such as
preventing the spread of disease from improper handling of dead bodies, it still
could not use this interest to justify a regulation on casket sellers who do not
handle dead bodies.
C. Arguments Against Applying Intermediate Scrutiny
Some have argued that the Supreme Court should declare that economic
protectionism is not a legitimate government interest but continue to apply the
rational basis test.119 If the Supreme Court were to simply declare that
economic protectionism is not a legitimate state interest, the problem of
onerous licensing laws would not be solved. Under rational basis review, the
government could proffer interests that are simply pretexts for a truly
protectionist law. Even if a state’s proffered interests were laughable, courts
could still assert that they should not invalidate a law under rational basis
review simply because it does not address a serious problem.120 Instead of
115. Craigmiles v. Giles, 110 F. Supp. 2d 658, 662–63 (E.D. Tenn. 2000), aff’d, 312 F.3d 220
(6th Cir. 2002) (finding no evidence of public safety risk from faulty caskets). Caskets do not
protect the environment, public health, or safety. See Affidavit of Lisa Carlson at 5, Craigmiles,
110 F. Supp. 2d 658 (E.D. Tenn. 2000) (No. 1:99-cv-00304). There are no public health or
environmental problems in parts of the world where people are buried without caskets or where
gravesites are repeatedly reused. Id. No state requires a container for burial, and disposition of
other mammals is unregulated. Id. In the case of rare infectious diseases, health officials
recommend body bags, not any particular casket. Id.
116. See Craigmiles, 312 F.3d at 226; Affidavit of Charles L. Crawford at 16–17, Craigmiles,
110 F. Supp. 2d 658 (E.D. Tenn. 2000) (No. 1:99-cv-00304).
117. St. Joseph Abbey v. Castille, 712 F.3d 215, 219 (5th Cir. 2013); Regulatory Review of
the Trade Regulation Rule on Funeral Industry Practices, 73 Fed. Reg. 13,740, 13,745 (Mar. 14,
2008).
118. St. Joseph Abbey, 712 F.3d at 225; Craigmiles, 312 F.3d at 226.
119. See Elizabeth Trafton, Comment, The Fifth Circuit Lays Economic Protectionism to Rest
in St. Joseph Abbey, 55 B.C. L. REV. 141, 152 (2014).
120. See Powers v. Harris, 379 F.3d 1208, 1217 (10th Cir. 2004).
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considering the validity of the state’s consumer protection interest, the Powers
court came to its conclusion based on the premise that protectionism is a
legitimate state interest.121 However, its analysis and interpretation of Supreme
Court precedent suggest that it would have upheld the law even without that
premise. The majority opinion stresses that rational basis review only requires
a loose fit between the means and ends of a law, and that a court cannot
second-guess the legislature’s wisdom.122 It also emphasizes that courts are
obligated to seek out conceivable reasons for a statute and criticizes the
Craigmiles court’s inquiry into the actual motive for Tennessee’s licensing
law.123 This suggests that the Powers court would have upheld the law based
on the same weak consumer protection interests that St. Joseph Abbey and
Craigmiles rejected.
Some have suggested that the second-order rational basis test should be
applied when analyzing the constitutionality of occupational licensing laws.124
However, applying the second-order rational basis test would not solve the
problems posed by licensing laws either. Because the second-order rational
basis test is poorly defined, it may not be as rigorously applied in some courts.
Even if the Powers court had inquired into the history and motive surrounding
Oklahoma’s casket licensing law, the court could have also required the
plaintiff to prove that the legislature’s sole intent was protectionism. This
would still be second-order rational basis review but would differ from
Craigmiles and St. Joseph Abbey, where the courts allowed the plaintiffs to
prevail by simply contradicting the states’ rationales. Also, applying the
second-order rational basis test would not have prevented the Powers court
from finding economic protectionism to be a legitimate government interest.
Though the second-order rational basis test typically requires a stronger
government interest,125 courts could still decide that economic protectionism is
important enough that it still fits within this slightly narrower definition of
legitimate government interest.
One may argue that applying intermediate scrutiny to occupational
licensing would put all licenses in danger—including those for doctors and
lawyers. Applying intermediate scrutiny, while preventing economic
protectionism, would not prevent legitimate occupational regulation that serves
the public good. Intermediate scrutiny will not be a hard standard to meet if a
regulation has a real purpose besides protectionism. In fact, a law that is
motivated by protectionism can still be upheld as long as it is related to a more
important interest as well. Licensing laws for doctors would have no problem

121.
122.
123.
124.
125.

Id. at 1218, 1222.
Id. at 1217.
Id. at 1217, 1223.
Raynor, supra note 112, at 1101–02.
Id. at 1074.
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meeting this standard. Protecting individuals from physical harm is an
important government interest because of the high risk inherent in the medical
profession. Improper medical services can result in serious injury or death.
Likewise, occupational licensing for lawyers would easily survive intermediate
scrutiny. Protecting consumers from legal malpractice is an important
government interest because, for the client, the stakes can be extremely high.
Improper legal services can result in the loss of property, freedom, or even life.
The important interests behind licensing doctors and lawyers will easily satisfy
intermediate scrutiny as long as the required training remains relevant to
practicing law and medicine. The only laws threatened would be those solely
motivated by protectionism because, if they actually protect consumers, the
government should have no problem demonstrating that they are “substantially
related” to protecting consumers. Further, since the rule would only apply to
occupational licensing laws, its effect would be limited.
A common theme in current Supreme Court case law is deference to the
legislature, exemplified by the rational basis test. Proponents of legislative
deference believe that the ability of individuals to vote and to lobby their
representatives is a sufficient check against bad laws. However, when dealing
with occupational licensing problems, legislative deference is not appropriate.
Established industry groups are in a better position to lobby legislatures, so
they dominate competitors and consumers in the political process.126
Consumers do not spend time or money opposing protectionist laws because
the negative effects of those laws are widely dispersed among consumers in the
form of higher prices, creating collective action problems.127 With harms so
widely dispersed, the potential benefit to be gained from lobbying
representatives is outweighed by the cost of doing so. Add to that the small
probability that an individual consumer will actually change the law,
consumers have little incentive to try to influence the legislature. Competitors
face the same collective action problems that consumers face. Not yet
established in the industry, potential competitors are likely to lack the
resources that established professionals have to lobby legislatures. Though the
harms of occupational licensing are widely disbursed among consumers and
competitors, the benefits are highly concentrated among current
practitioners.128 This gives current practitioners a strong incentive to lobby for
licensing laws that will make it harder for newcomers to compete.

126. Miles O. Indest, Walking Dead: The Fifth Circuit Resurrects Rational Basis Review, 88
TUL. L. REV. 993, 1004–05 (2014); Antonios Roustopoulos, The Fifth Circuit Buries Intrastate
Economic Protectionism in St. Joseph Abbey v. Castille, 59 VILL. L. REV. 341, 367–68 (2014).
127. Roustopoulos, supra note 126, at 367–68.
128. Abbott, supra note 39, at 503.
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D. Effects of Applying Intermediate Scrutiny
Applying intermediate scrutiny to occupational licensing laws would not
only help casket sellers. States require licenses for countless other occupations
that do not affect the general welfare of the public, such as yoga instructors,129
hair braiders, shampoo specialists, boxing promoters, interior designers, and
florists.130 Protectionist licensing laws are not rare. All fifty states and the
District of Columbia license pest control applicators and cosmetologists.131
Fifty states license skin care specialists, manicurists, and barbers.132 Forty-six
states license athletic trainers, forty-one license fishers, thirty-nine license
massage therapists, thirty-six license makeup artists, thirty-five license door
repairers, thirty-three license auctioneers, twenty-six license taxidermists,
twenty-one license travel guides, twenty license animal trainers, sixteen license
sign language interpreters, nine license funeral attendants, eight license travel
agents, five license shampooers, and four license interior designers.133 The
expansive ways these laws are crafted allow them to affect even more
occupations. For example, thirty-nine states and the District of Columbia
require individuals to obtain a cosmetology or similar license to braid hair.134
At least thirty states have attempted to require teeth whiteners to get a dental
license.135 States have required that practitioners of non-pesticide-based pest
control undergo training that is irrelevant to their line of work.136 Several
states137 require horse teeth floaters (individuals who file down horses’ teeth—
a painless and low-risk exercise) to attend four years of veterinary college that
does not teach horse teeth floating.138 Some states require animal massage
therapists to spend hundreds of thousands of dollars on four years of veterinary
school that does not teach animal massage, even though massage therapists are

129. Julie Turkewitz, Colorado Yogis Balk at State Regulation of Teacher Training, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 2, 2015, at A14.
130. See Roustopoulos, supra note 126, at 366.
131. CARPENTER ET AL., supra note 37, at 10–11.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. AVELAR & SIBILLA, supra note 10, at 3.
135. Erickson & Sherman, supra note 31.
136. Merrifield v. Lockyer, 547 F.3d 978, 982–83 (9th Cir. 2008).
137. See State Summary Report: Authority of Veterinary Technicians and Other NonVeterinarians to Perform Dental Procedures, AM. VETERINARY MED. ASS’N, http://www.avma.
org/advocacy/stateandlocal/pages/sr-dental-procedures.aspx [http://perma.cc/44RK-SQ27] (last
updated Oct. 2014).
138. Challenging Barriers to Economic Opportunity: Challenging Minnesota’s Occupational
Licensing of Horse Teeth Floaters, INST. FOR JUST., http://www.ij.org/minnesota-horse-teethfloating-background [http://perma.cc/3TEV-YB4U] (last visited Oct. 8, 2015).
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not required to get any medical degree to massage humans.139 Applying
intermediate scrutiny would ensure that states do not license occupations like
interior design that do not need to be licensed, and it would ensure that
individuals are not required to obtain professional licenses that are not related
to their work.
Applying intermediate scrutiny would help eliminate the licensing laws
that harm consumers and economically disadvantaged groups, and would place
a check on special interests. Though states have been given extreme deference
in the post-Lochner era, courts examining protectionist licensing laws have
expressed their disapproval of using rational basis review as a rubber-stamp.
To prevent the proliferation of different types of poorly defined rational basis
review, the Supreme Court should provide an easy-to-apply standard that
allows courts to address unfair licensing laws. Rational basis review lacks
teeth, and its application to occupational licensing has had negative effects on
consumers, entrepreneurs, and the poor. The right to earn a living is one of the
most important rights an individual has because it has dramatic effects on
every aspect of his or her life. This inalienable right to pursue happiness is
enshrined in the Declaration of Independence. Thomas Jefferson wrote that
“the first principle of association” was “the guarantee to every one of a free
exercise of his industry, and the fruits acquired by it,”140 and that “every one
has a natural right to choose for his pursuit such one of them as he thinks most
likely to furnish him subsistence.”141 The opportunity to prosper and succeed,
which allows social mobility, is the basis of the American Dream. By applying
intermediate scrutiny to occupational licensing laws, the Court can begin to
recognize the importance of the right to earn a living and the judiciary’s role in
protecting that right.
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court should address occupational licensing laws and the
circuit split that they have created. In doing so, it should recognize the futility
of the rational basis test and acknowledge the importance of economic freedom
by categorically applying the well-defined intermediate scrutiny test to
occupational licensing laws. This would provide relief in cases of particularly
unfair economic protectionism but would not prevent legislatures from solving
important social ills as they see fit. This limited relief would still have a

139. See Challenging Irrational Barriers to Economic Opportunity: Freeing Arizona Animal
Massage Entrepreneurs from the Veterinary Cartel, INST. FOR JUST., http://ij.org/arizona-animalmassage-backgrounder [http://perma.cc/8MPD-8HQX] (last visited Oct. 8, 2015).
140. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Joseph Milligan, April 6, 1816, in 14 THE WRITINGS OF
THOMAS JEFFERSON 456, 466 (Albert Ellery Bergh ed., 1905).
141. Thoughts on Lotteries, February, 1826, in 17 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON
448, 449 (Albert Ellery Bergh ed., 1905).
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positive effect on economically disadvantaged consumers and would-be
competitors.
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